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CASE COMMENTS
CONVEYANC

oF MERE, EXPECTANCY FR0M PERSON TaEN Liv-

n G Is Vom.-The plaintiffs, two brothers, conveyed their undivided interest in their mother's estate to a third brother before
the mother died. The third brother conveyed to the defendant's
grantor. Plaintiffs now seek to recover their interest in the
land owned by their mother at the time of her death, and seek
a partition thereof by the joint owners. Held, the conveyance
of a mere expectancy from a person then living is void. Judgment for the plaintiffs. Appealed. Judgment affirmed.
The authorities are divided on the question whether a conveyance of a mere expectancy from a person then alive is valid.
The weight of authority, however, seems to be that a conveyance
of an interest as heir of a person then living is valid and passes
good title.
Illinois has adopted the view that an estate in expectancy
may be the subject of a contract of sale, and where the transaction is fair and supported by a valuable and adequate consideration, such a contract will be sustained in that jurisdiction.
Hudson v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 527, 78 N. E. 917; Simmons v. Ross,
270 Ill. 372; Donough v. Garland,109 N. E. 1015.
The position of the Illinois courts is supported by the following cases in other jurisdictions: Blackwell v. Harrelson, 94
S. C. .264; Taylor v. Swafford, 122 Tenn. 303; Searcy v. Gwaltney
Bros., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 158; Hale v. Hallon, 90 Tex. 427.
The California Civil Code, Sections 700 and 1045, makes
void at law an heir's conveyance of his expectancy, but holds
that such a conveyance may be enforced in equity as an agreement to convey by way of estoppel. In re Wiekersham's Estate,
138 Cal. 335; Bridge v. Kendon, 163 Cal. 493.
Edler v. Frazier,156 N. W. 182 (Iowa, 1916) holds that a
mere possible or expectant interest in property is assignable,
and that the assignment will be enforced in equity when the
expectancy ripens into a vested estate. In Dunham v. Bentley,
103 Ia. 136, however, it was held that an assignment of a son's
prospective interest in his father's estate was invalid, but that
it might become operative by a ratification by the son after the
father's death.
The Kentucky rule that the conveyance of an estate in expectancy is invalid, is not, however, without support. The
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Indiana courts regard the conveyance of such an interest with
such disfavor that one who attempts to enforce such a contract
must allege and prove that there was neither fraud nor oppression in the contract. McClure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507.
In re Lenning's Estate, 182 Pa. 485, exactly coincides with
the Kentucky doctrine that an estate in expectancy is not the
subject of a grant, while Stevens v. Stevens, 181 Afich. 438, lays
down the unequivocal rule that a contract to buy the prospective
interests of the heirs apparent of an owner of land, living at the
time the contract was made, is not enforceable in law or in
equity, where the owner had not consented to the sale.
In Spears v. Spaw, 118 S. W. 275 (Ky., 1909), it was held
that a deed by which the grantors assumed to convey their in-,
terest in land which their mother owned in fee, during their
mother's lifetime, was void both in law and in equity, even
That case
though the mother consented to such conveyance.
went even further than Halt v. Hall, 153 Ky. 379, which latter
case under facts almost identical with those in the case at bar,
held that "deeds by certain of the testator's children conveying
their interests in his estate to one of their number during the
testator's lifetime, were void for want of subject matter in esse
at the time the contract was made."
Spacey v. Close, 184 Ky. 523, and Hunt v. Smith, 191 Ky.
443, are in entire accord with the established principle of law in
Kentucky, that a conveyance by an heir of his expectancy in an
estate, is void. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Riddle, et at, 198 Ky.
Z. I. F.
256.
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE AS TO A PREVIOUS OFFEsE.-The
Commonwealth in order to impeach as a witness the defendant, who was charged with murder, propounded to him questions
concerning his previous trial and conviction of a misdemeanor
committed several months before the killing, and in no way
connected with it. The trial court compelled defendant to answer these questions. Held: -That compelling defendant to
testify regarding a previous trial for a misdemeanor, having no
connection with the homicide, and throwing no light on the
motive with which it was committed, is reversible error.
From the decisions of the Courts of Kentucky it seems that
there are only three circumstances under which it is permissible
to prove that a defendant has committed another offense: First,
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if he offers himself as a witness he may be impeached by showing that he has been convicted of a felony; second, proof of other
offenses committed by the defendant may be admitted in order
to show the motive for the crime with which he is charged; and,
third, in a case where another offense is part of the res gestae
it may be shown.
From the rules it is clear that the evidence against defendant was improperly admitted. He was compelled to testify in
regard to a previous offense in no way connected with the one
for which he was on trial, and the question of motive was not
entered into. In Snapp v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 173, the court
said: The rule admitting proof of other offenses of a similar
nature and committed by the defendant about the same time,
cannot be extended to admit evidence against accused of an independent offense committed at some other time. And, Flint v.
Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 86, "In a prosecution for a particular.
offense evidence tending to show accused guilty of another distinct offense, disconnected with the crime charged is inadmissible."
The introduction of proof of the commission of other crimes
to show motive must be given by other than accused, and he
cannot be required over his protest to do so on his own crossexamination. Page v. Commonwealth, 119 S. W. 750. In Tapscott v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 573, it was held to be reversible
error to compel defendant in a trial for murder to testify that
he had been convicted of selling liquor. Martin v. CommonC. H. L.
wealth, 197 Ky. 43.
DESCENT AND" DIsTnIBUTION-ETECT OP A FRAUDULENT
CoNVEYANYCE TO Avom CREDITRS.-Appellants are heirs of a

purchaser who bought land and had it conveyed to appellee to
avoid creditors. Appellants seek to have the deed cancelled.
The general rule is that a conveyance made for the purpose
of defrauding the creditors of the grantor is good, not only as
between the parties thereto and their privies, but as to everyone,
except the creditors defrauded thereby; and that, except as to
them, the legal title in the grantee is perfect. 67 L. R. A. 889;
Harris v. Taylor, 15 Cal. 348; Ward v. Enders, 29 Ill. 519;
Edwards v. Haverstick, 53 Ind. 348. A case which is exactly in
point with the principle case holds that a conveyance of real
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estate, fraudulent as to creditors, is nevertheless valid against
the grantor and his heirs, and the land thus conveyed will constitute no part of his estate at his death. George v. Williamson,
26 Mo. 190.
Kentucky comes within the general rule. In Neal v. Neal,
26 Ky. L. R. 962, the court said that inasmuch as the grantor of
a conveyance to defraud creditors can not complain or have it
set aside, neither can his heirs at law, as they stand in his shoes.
A like doctrine is held in Dorsey v. Phillips,84 Ky. 420.
The basis for this rule lies in the maxim of equity, that
parties in pan delicto shall be left as found, not to be touched
by equity. An action for the cancellation of a deed is an equitable one, and equity will have nothing to do with a tainted or
fraudulent transaction, unless an- innocent third party, not
claiming as a privy to one of the wrongdoers, can be given relief.
Hardin v. Johnson, 198 Ky. 187.
Decided March 9, 1923.
E. E.S.
FRAUDS-STATUTE OF-CONTRACT Or AGENCY TO SELL LAND
-BROK
L
-- nmIY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO RESELL

WHEREBY T=-Y INDUCED PURCHASERS TO BuY.-W. J. Oliver &
Co. were agents for Shipley to sell a farm. In order to induce
Morgan to buy they promised orally to subdivide the farm, in
case he should buy it, and sell it in small farms and lots so as to
meet the payments on the purchase, Oliver & Co. to bear all
expense of the resale and to receive twenty per cent of the
profits, if any. Morgan told them that he could not buy unless
they carried out this promise. He paid Shipley the first payment of $2,500 and defaulted on the next payment, thereby los.
ing his $2,500, due to refusal of Oliver & Co. to carry out their
oral agreement.
Oliver & Co. claim that this was an oral agreement concerning the sale of land within section 470 of the Kentucky Statutes
(the Statute of Frauds) and could not be enforced.
It has been repeatedly held by the courts that a contract
appointing an agent to find a purchaser for land is not within
the section of the statute of frauds concernifig the sale of land.
(Womack v. Douglas, 157 Ky. 716; Monroe v. Bailey, et ux, 145
Ky. 794; Kempner v. Gans, 87 Ark. 221). In Mucke v. Solomon, (79 Conn. 297), it was held that in an action against a real
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estate agent for misconduct the relation of principal and agent
may be established by parol notwithstanding the statute of
frauds.
It is true that in this case the purchaser paid the vendor,
who paid the broker his commission, but the broker induced
Morgan to buy in order that he might get the commission, so
that the collateral agreement may be conceived of as being for
the benefit of the agent as well as for the benefit of Morgan.
In Huff v. Fuller (197 Ky. 119) it was held that when a
sale of land is effected by a collateral agreement the benefits of
the sale cannot be retained by the party to the collateral agreement who fails to perform without compensating the other party
for his failure to perform.
In an action against a broker in charge of a building for
failure to secure a subtenant, in accordance with an agreement
made by him with the tenant as an inducement to make the original lease, the broker was held liable for the actual damages sustained by the tenant (Chapman v. Geo. Read & Co., 133 N. Y.
625). The actual damage sustained is the rule for recovery in
cases of misrepresentation by brokers, (Roberts v. Holliday, 10
S. D. 576; Rice v. Porter, 21 K. L. R. 871). The same rule applied in the case under discussion would give Morgan the right
to recover the money actually paid out by him for the purchase,
which was lost by his default due to the failure of the agent to
carry out his agreement to resell. This amounted to $2,500.
The court held accordingly.
441.

Oliver v. Morgan, 198 Ky.
J. W. C.

IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT.-A boy twelve years old,
was employed by a lumber company to haul lumber from its sawmill to its yard, a short distance away. His pants leg caught
in a loose plank along the tramway and he was thrown under the
truck he was driving and both legs were broken. Neither his
father nor the company foreman could find a licensed physician
to take care of the boy, so finally at the father's suggestion the
foreman sent for an unlicensed physician who got there about
twelve hours later and treated the boy. The defendant claims
there was contributory negligence in not getting better medical
aid and that plaintiff aggravated his damage in refusing to un-
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dergo a second treatment. An injured adult is only required to
exercise ordinary care and prudence in the selection of his physician and as in this case he must accept such as the country affords, certainly under like circumstances no more could be expected of a twelve year old boy.
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Mont', 31 Ky. Rep. 210, holds that in an
action for personal injuries by a passenger, where contributory
negligence is alleged in a failure of the passenger to use personal
care or to procure proper surgical treatment, the jury should be
instructed that the injured party should use only ordinary care
and prudence in procuring medical aid. 8 R. C. L. page 449
and C. C. B. Co. v. Sexby, 6 L. R. A. 164, holds to the same effect.
Even if the father could have been able to procure another
physician and negligently failed to do so this negligence could
not be imputed to the child. A. C. Co. v. Manic, 163 Ky. 796;
L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Wilkins, 143 Ky. 576. One is not required
to take the risk of a serious surgical operation for the benefit of
the wrongdoer, and his failure to do so does not reduce his verdict to merely nominal damages. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v.
Boone, 180 Ky. 199, holds that while it has never been held as a
matter of law to be the duty of an injured person to submit to a
serious surgical operation for the purpose of effecting a cure, he
must, however, exercise ordinary care not to aggravate the injury or to insure his damage. 8 R. C. L., 178 Ky. 486 holds accordingly.
The judgment for $10,000 is affirmed as there is no imputed
negligence shown on the part of the parent and the damages do
not seem to be excessive. H. T. Whitson Lumber Co. v. Upebuch, By, etc., 198 Ky. 127.
J. W. C.
LiFE ESTATE---HOLDER MAY OPERATE CLAY PITS OPEN ON
THE LAND BEFORE THE ESTATE IS CREATED.-A life tenant leased
property and his lessee operated clay pits located on the land.
The pits had been in operation before the life tenant's estate
created, but there had been a suspension in the operation of the
clay pits for some time before the life tenant took his estate.
The holder of a life estate in the lands of which there had
not been opened wells or mines during life of previous holder of
the fee simple estate, may not open or sink such mines or wells
or pits, and if he does he commits waste against the remainder
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and may be restrained in the operation of such pits by the remainder. But if during life of previous holder there has been
opened by him or under his authority, wells or pits or mines and
the same have been operated during his lifetime and are in
operation at time of creation of particular estate, then the holder
of the particular estate may continue their operation during
such holding even to the exhaustion of the mineral substance
found therein, unless there be in the instrument creating the
life estate some restraint or restriction of such right. Daniels
v. Ckarles, 172 Ky. 238. The life tenant has a right to use a pit
for his own profit where the owner of the fee in his lifetime
opened it, even though he may have discontinued the work upon
it for a long period of years; a mere cessation of work, however long the period, will not defeat the life tenant's right.
Gaines v. Green Pond Iron Co., 33 N. J. Equity 15. The holder
of the fee simple did not intend to abandon the pits, as the reason
for the suspension in the operation of the pits was that the death
of the holder's husband did not leave the holder in position to
operate the pits. Where the pits have been opened during the
life of holder of the fee there must be a clear intention on the
part of the holder to abandon the pits to defeat the rights of
the life tenant, mere suspension of operation is never sufficient.
87 L. T. (N. S.) 33.
The owner of the life estate had a right to operate the pits
as there was neither a restriction in the instrument creating the
estate nor an abandonment during the life of the holder of the
fee simple estate. If, therefore, the owner was within his rights
in operating these clay pits and had a right to operate them,
even to exhaustion, during his lifetime, it is clear the remainderman could not have interfered with their operation by the
owner's lessee, even though the operation by lessee may have
been under a void contract. Tomlinson, et at. v. Humpic, et al.,
198 Ky. 474.
H. W. P.
MUNICrPAL CORPORATIONS--PARDONS--POWER

OP MAYOR TO

GRANT.-The Commissioners of the city having all executive,
legislative and administrative power, may confer on the mayor,
by proper resolutions, the power to grant pardons and to release prisoners from the city jail who have been convicted of offenses against the city ordinances. Under Kentucky Statutes,
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section 3111, the mayor of a second class city may discharge from
confinement persons convicted of offenses against the city ordinances. This section of the statute was enacted to cover the old
form of city government, under the Alderman form of administration. Under Kentucky Statutes, section 3235c-12, an act in
reference to commission form of city government, it is provided
that the mayor and four commissioners have all legislative, executive and administrative power of the city. It appears by the
Kentucky Statutes that the power to pardon is vested in the
mayor and commissioners. The board of commissioners could
as a body exercise the power to pardon, and had the right to
delegate that power to one of its members as it did other city
government affairs. Kentucky Statutes, section 3235c-17, gave
the board of commissioners power to pass ordinances determining
the functions of each department and prescribing the duties of
its commissioners. This governmental function, being partly
executive, naturally passed to the mayor by ordinance of the
commissioners, without power in the charter of the city, authorizing the mayor to pardon.
The general rule seems to be that since authority to grant
pardons for violations of municipal ordinances does not vest in
the governor, an ordinance vesting such authority in the mayor
by and with the consent of the commissioners is not invalid, but
vests in the mayor the power to grant pardons for offences
against the city ordinances. Allen, v. McGuire, 100 Miss. 781;
38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 196; 20 R. C. L. 546; 29 Cyc. 1562; Commonwealth v. French, 130 Ky. 774. Upon reading the Kentucky
Statutes and considering the general rule upon the subject, one
would conclude that the board of commissioners had power to
confer upon the mayor any of the functions of city government,
including the power to pardon or release from confinement offenders against the laws of the municipality. It was so held in
Moore, Police Judge v. City of Newport, 198 Ky. 118. Feb.
H. W. F.
13, 1923.
PARENT AND OHID-

,ANCIPATIO

-LIABrITY

OF FATHER

SoN.-A boy between
sixteen and eighteen years of age left home and supported himself for two years in accordance with an agreement with his
father. It became necessary for the boy to have an operation
FOR MEDICAL SERVICE TO AN EMANCIPATED
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performed on himself. The father gave the sister of the boy
permission in writing to have the operation performed, and
stated in the note that he would not be responsible for the expense of operation, or the doctor's fee. The operation was performed. The surgeon was not shown the note until after the
work was done by him. He sued the father for his fee.
It has been held that though an infant has been emancipated, and has supported himself for some time, if the child becomes unable to support himself, the father's duty revives.
Porterv. Powell, 79 Ia. 551; Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238;
Clark v. Fitch, 2 Wend. (N. Y.) 459. However, this rule seems
to apply only to cases of prolonged or permanent disability, and
probably would not be applicable to a case of temporary disability such as the present.
in Wallace v. Cox, 136 Tenn. 69, it was held that complete
emancipation, which will bar a right of action against a parent
for medical services rendered to his infant daughter, is not
shown by proof of the fact that she lived away from home, and
supported herself out of her own earnings, but there were facts
in the case- which showed that the father had not given up all
rights of control over the daughter.
In the case under discussion there was a complete surrender
of control. The note was a mere affirmance of the emancipation
in that it denied liability of the parent for necessaries. A
parent is not liable for necessaries supplied to an emancipated
child. Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669; Morse v. Wvelton,
6 Conn. 547.
Express emancipation is not necessary to free the father
from liability, for the court quotes with approval 29 Cyc., p.
1673, where it is said, "Emancipation may be express or implied,
in writing, or oral." If no express emancipation could be
shown in this case, emancipation may be implied under the rule
that when a child is physically and mentally able to care for
himself, and he leaves home and supports himself without protest on the part of the parent within a reasonable time, he is
emancipated. Iroquois Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 294
Ill. 106; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Davis (Ky.), 105 S. W. 455; Mauck
v. So. Ry. Co., 148 Ky. 122. In the L. &N. R. R. Co. v. Davis, the
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father was not allowed to recover for injury to the son after the
boy began to support himself. Where the benefits of the relationship are cut off, the liabilities should also cease.
The fact that the doctor was not aware of the emancipation
at the time of rendering service does not affect the case, for every
person who deals with an infant is bound at his peril to inquire
and ascertain the real circumstances of the infant before he
can hold the parent liable for support. Brosius v. Baker, 154
Mo. App. 657. This seems to be the general ruling on this point.
Under these circumstances there is no liability on the part
of the father for the operation. Simmons v. Stewart, 198 Ky.
275.
5.W.G.
PARTIEs NOT ACTING TOGETHER ARE NOT JoiNTLY LIALE
FOR SPARE TORT..-Suit was brought against several oil companies jointly, for polluting a stream rmnning through plaintiff's
land and for damages to his land. The defendants demurred.
All the demurrers were sustained and the court gave the plaintiff the right to elect against which defendant he would proceed.
Ile declined to plead further so the petition was dismissed and
the plaintiff appealed.
'When several persons act separately and independently and
not in concert, one of them is not liable for all the damages occasioned by their separate acts, but each is liable only for the
damage ddne by his separate act. So a joint suit cannot be
maintained against sev'eral companies for the total damage,
which was caused by the separate acts of each company. In
109 Ky. 647 the plaintiff failed to recover damages from several
defendants for injuries caused to the wall of his storehouse and
carriage factory by water flowing from the'sewer and waste pipe
into which the defendants were turning their waste water. It
was held that each defendant was liable only for the damage
done by his own act. In Williard v. Red Bank Oil Co., 151 Ill.
App. 433, the court said: "A person polluting a water course is
liable in damages only for his act, and not for that of any others
who may contribute to the injury. If others have contributed,
his must be separated by means of the best proof the nature of
the case affords and his liability ascertained accordingly." These
cases follow the great weight of authority and as the allegations
of the petition are not sufficient to make out a case of joint liability it can be seen that the court did not err in sustaining the
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motion to elect and dismissing the petition upon the plaintiff's
failure to comply wiih the order. Watson v. Pyramid Oil Co.,
198 Ky. 135.
J. W. C.
RESTRAnmT Ox ALIENATION-VoiD.-The will under which
the plaintiffs claim the premises in question contained a provision that the devisees thereof should never sell or dispose of any
of the lands therein devised, to anyone except to one another.
The plaintiffs brought this action to enforce a lien retained by
them to secure a portion of the purchase money for a part of
this land, sold to the defendant. The defendant asked for a
rescission of the contract on the ground that the title thereto
was defective by reason of the restrictive clause contained in the
will under which the plaintiffs claim. Held, a restrain on
alienation is invalid, and the plaintiffs could convey a good title
to the defendant. Appeal by the defendant to reverse the judg
ment. Judgment affirmed.
Absolute restraint on the alienation of land by one having
a fee simple title thereto is invalid, since such restraint is inconsistent with the estate granted or devised. Littleton (See.
360) lays down the following rule, from which later decisions
have deviated but little: "If a feoffment be made upon this condition, that the feoffee shall not alien the land to any, this condition is void because when a man is enfeoffed of land or tenements, he hath power to alien them to any person by the law."
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, accords with this view.

Norse v. Blood, 71 N. W. 682 (Minn.) held that "A condition in a will devising and bequeathing all'personal and real
property to the testator's wife on condition that she in no case
should give or bequeath one cent of said estate to any relation
of her own or to any member of the testator's family, was
against.public policy and void as being in restraint of alienation."
There is little to be gained in multiplying authorities to
show that an absolute restraint on alienation of land is void,
since the rule is generally recognized both in this country and
in England. In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. (Eng.) 801; Attwater v.
Attwater, 18 Beav. (Eng.) 330; Christmas v. Winster, 152 N. C.
48, 67 S. E. 58; Ckappel v. Chappel, 119 S. W. 218; Harkness v.
Lisle, 132 Ky. 767.
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There is an intermediate line of decisions, however, which
should be considered since the authorities are in conflict on the
question whether restraints on alienation which are not absolute,
but merely suspended or limited to certain persons, are void.
Section 2360, Ky. Stat., says, "The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition
whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of a
life, or lives in being at the creation of the estate, and twentyone years and ten months thereafter."
In holding that a restraint on alienation until the devisee
should reach a certain age was valid, Stewart v. Brady, 3 Bush.
623, followed the Kentucky Statute, but accorded with the
minority view in this country and in England. This view,
however, has been substantiated by other Kentucky decisions,
among which are the following: Kean's Guardianv. Kean, 18 S.
W. 1032; Johnsan v. Dumeyer, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 2243. Overton
v. Lea, 68 S.W. 250, 108 Tenn. 505, also supports the decision
reached in Stewart v. Brady, supra, in its holding that where a
son devised his estate to his .widowed mother on condition that
any part of the estate should not come into the hands of his
sister, her husband, or their children, and upon the further condition that she should not re-marry, the conditional limitations
were-valid. The following rule was laid down in that important
Tennessee case: "Any conditional limitation upon the power
of alienation which is so restricted as not to be inconsistent with
a reasonable enjoyment of the fee is valid. If the estate had
been given on condition that the devisee should alien it to no
one, such condition would have been void. But if the condition
be such that the feoffee shall not alien to such an one, naming
him, or that the foeffee shall not re-marry, such condition is
valid. '
"
Opposed to the view stated above we have in Zillmer v.
Landgutk, 69 N. W. 568, 94 Wis. 607, a decision by the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin that the suspension of the power of alienation for any period is void as being repugnant to the estate
granted. Oxley v. Lane, 35 N. Y. 340, meets the issue squarely
and decides that a condition in a will suspending the power of
alienation for a fixed time is void. Muhlke v. Tiedemann, 52 N.
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E. 843, 177 Ill. 606, and Hageman v. Hageman, 21 N. E. 814,
support the view that even a slight restraint upon alienation of
an estate is void.
Although Kentucky cases have held valid reasonable limitations on and suspensions of the power of alienation, it will be
seen that the general rule that absolute restraint on alienation
by one having a title in fee is void, as being against public policy
and repugnant to the estate granted, has been followed in this
state. Carpenter v. Allen, 198 Ky. 252.
Z. I. F.
SAL-E-MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARiANTY OF

SEEDS WICH WERE NOT TRUE TO

N mE.Appellee bought seeds

which were warranted by appellants to be German millet. The
warranty given was exactly the same that appellants had received from their wholesaler. Appellee examined the seeds
when he bought them. The seeds produced a crop which was
comparatively worthless, $150, whereas if the seeds had been
true to name the crop would have been worth much more, about
$1,000. What is the measure of damages for breach of the warranty given?
For breach of express warranty that seed is true to name,
the measure of damages recoverable is the value of a crop had
the seed been true to name, such as ordinarily would have been
produced that year, deducting the expense of raising the crop,
and also the product and value of the crop actually raised.
Grutcherv. Elliott, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 592; Passengerv. Thorburn,
34 N. Y. 634; Waystaff v. Short-Horn Dairy Co., Cab. & El.,
324. These cases represent the weight of authority and rest on
the doctrine of allowing speculative damages.
Other jurisdictions frown on the idea of speculative damages, whether they be in regard to probability of crops from
seeds or anything else. In Hurley v. Buchi, 10 Lea, 346, the
right to recover speculative profits for breach of warranty in a
sale of seeds by description, where it is breached by furnishing
seed of a different kind, is denied, and the measure of damages
is said to be the difference between the seed delivered and the
value of the seed had it been as represented or warranted. In
regard to speculative damages in general, it may be said that
where the damages claimed are so speculative and dependent on
numerous and changing contingencies that their amount is not

CASE COMMENTS

susceptible of actual proof without reasonable degree of certainty
no recovery can be had. Reed Lbr. Co. v. Lewis, 94 &Ia. 626;
Unruh v. Taylor, 43 Atl. 515.
In the present case the fact that the buyer inspected the
seed before buying is immaterial because any reasonable inspection of the seed would not disclose the character. Grafton-Stamp
Drug Co. v. Williams, 105 Miss. 296.
The Kentucky court is with the weight of authority in holding the measure of damages to be the difference between the
crop produced and that which should have been produced. The
Kentucky case, G-ritteher v. Elliott, supra, is one of the leading
authorities in support of the doctrine that damages should be
the difference between the crop produced and that which should
have been produced. Hobdy anid Reed v. Siddens, et al., 198
E. E. S.
Ky. 195. Decided March 9, 1923.
SLANDER-

ARGE OF FORNICATION, INCEST AND ADULTERY

NEED NOT BE MTADE L-T DIRECT TERMS TO CON1STITUTE LIBEL AND

a general rule at common law words imputing unchastity or immorality were not actionable per se, because unchastity as a subject of ecclesiastical congnizance was not punishable in common law courts. That the law of Kentucky is no
exception to this rule is shown by the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Elliott v. Ailsberry, 2 Bibb 473, where it is specifically decided that to charge a female with want of chastity is not
actionable, and such was the law in a number of the states. Some
of the jurisdictions of the United States, however, refused to accept this rule. Courts of Iowa and Ohio early decide that to
charge a female with unchastity is actionable of itself. Cox, et
,uz v. Bunker, et ux, 1 Morris (1844) 269; Abrams v. Foshee, 3
Iowa 274; Smith v. Silence, 4 Iowa 321; Thruman, et ux v. Taylor, 4 Iowa 424; Barnett v. Ward, 36 Ohio St. 10, 38 Amer. Rep.
561.
SLANDER.-AS

Today in most jurisdictions of this country this rule has
been relaxed either by the progress of enlightened sentiment acting through the courts of highest resort, or.by statutes enacted
by the legislative bodies. Section 1 of the Kentucky Statutes
provides, "A charge of incest, fornication or adultery against a
female shall be actionable and in such cases the plaintiff shall
not be held to allege or prove special damages."
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With the apparent laxation of this rule there has arisen the
question~of just what statements or words are necessary to impute unchastity to a female. In Bishop v. Smith, 198 Ky. 230,
the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that it is not essential that
the charge be made in direct terms, but it is sufficient if the
words used are such as to impute unchastity, and were so understood by those who heard them, citing 17 R. 0. L., page 282.
"As a rule the words complained of are to be taken and understood in that sense which is most natural and obvious and according to the ideas they are calculated to convey to those they
are addressed. It is not essential that the charge be made in
direct terms but it is sufficient if the words used are such as to
impute unchastity, adultery, or fornication, and were so under
stood by those who heard them."
This rule was laid down by this court in a somewhat similar
case (Martin v. White, 188 Ky. 153) where the court says, "But
notwithstanding the statute (meaning section 1 of the Ky. Statutes) it is still a question for the courts to determine under the
general law of slander what words will constitute the charge of
adultery or fornication, and the general rules for determining
the sufficiency of the language to constitute the particular slander
sued for apply to this case. As in other cases it is not necessary
that the charge be made in direct, specific language so as to
show affirmatively and beyond doubt what the speaker meant,
but it is sufficient if the entire words employed, in their natural
and ordinary meaning, were calculated to impress the hearers
with the belief that the speaker intended to charge the particular
slander involved and that they so understood them." In support of this rule the court cites 25 Cyc. 319, 17 R. C. L. 282, and
Nicholson v. Rust, 21 Ky. L. R. 645. In this case last cited, the
court says specifically it is not necessary that the words should
make the charge in express terms, and that they are actionable
if they consist of a statement of matter which would naturally
and presumably be understood by the hearers as a charge of the
offense. This it seems is the well established rule in Kentucky.
In the case of Bishop v. Smitk, supra, the judgment of the
lower court sustaining defendant's demurrer and dismissing the
plaintiff's petition was affirmed because the alleged slanderous
words did not clearly import a criminal act even when taken in
their strongest light. However, it appears that if the words
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spoken clearly and unequivocally import the charge of unchastity, adultery or fornication so as to be so understood by those
who heard them, they will be actionable .perse under the statute
even though not made in direct or express terms. And as the
court says in this opinion, the tendency of modern decisions is
to liberalize the strictness of the former rulings of the common law in reference to actions of this character. Bishop v.
R. X. C.
Smith, 198 Ky. 230.
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PAR oL EvmEN6.-A husband took a deed to real estate in his
and his wife's names. His name was inserted without the consent or knowledge of his wife whose money he used. A creditor
sought to subject this property to a debt of the husband. Uncontradicted testimony of husband and wife showed that the
property was purchased with the proceeds of the sale of a house
and lot which had been purchased in the husband's name with
the wife's money. The wife had given her husband a check on
the above fund, which he was to use in purchasing the property
now under dispute for her. The debt was incurred before the
acquisition of any of the property. The creditor claimed that
the relationship of the parties raised a presumption of fraud
which the testimony of the husband and wife alone could not
overcome, and that parol evidence in support of the claim of
constructive trust was not admissible.
Constructive trusts are created by operation of law. Kentucky Statutes, section 2353, provides that "When a deed shall
be made to one person and the consideration paid by another,
no use or trust shall result in favor of the latter, but this shall
not extend to any case in which the grantee shall have taken a
deed in his own name without the consent of the person paying the consideration, or where the grantee in violation of
a trust, shall have purchased the lands deeded with the effects
of another person." This case falls under that statute. See
also Noe v. Roll, 134 Ind. 115; and Sieman v. Austin, 29 N.
Y. 598, where under a statute similar to the Kentucky statute
but without the clause regarding violation of trusts, facts similar
to these were held to create a constructive trust; and Moore v.
Crump, 84 Miss. 612.
Parol evidence is admissible to prove a constructive trust,
but it must be full, clear, and convincing; Tillar v. Henry, 75
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Ark. 446; Schwartz v. Gerhardt, 44 Oregon, 425; May v. May,
161 Ky. 114.
When the evidence is uncontradicted, it cannot be disregarded, for the relationship alone is not sufficient grounds for
casting aside clear evidence. Schwartz v. Gerhardt, 44 Oregon,
425; Lacey v. Layne, 190 Ky. 667; Deavers-Kennedy Co. v.
Cooper (Ky.), 224 S. W. 1053.
The creditor cannot claim that he had any right to rely on
the apparent ownership of the property by the husband, for the
property was purchased before the debtor, or his wife owned
any real property, so the court decided in accord with the above
stated rules that he had no right to subject the property to the
husband's debt. Deboe, et al. v. Brown, 198 Ky. 275. J. W. G.

